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The Association between Institutional Ownership and Audit Properties 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine how institutional ownership affects the quality and riskiness of 
the financial statement audit. We hypothesize that institutional investors can influence 
corporate policy to employ governance mechanisms that reduce their monitoring costs. Our 
evidence shows that firms are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor (our proxy for audit 
quality) when long-term institutional ownership is high, suggesting that long-term 
institutional investors view high quality audits as a viable means of improving corporate 
governance while reducing their direct monitoring costs. We find no association between 
auditor choice and short-term institutional ownership. Next, we find that auditors charge 
higher fees (our proxy for audit risk) when short-term institutional ownership is high, 
consistent with short-term investors creating greater incentives for managers to act 
myopically. We find no association between audit fees and long-term institutional 
ownership. Taken together, our evidence suggests that dedicated long-term institutional 
investors demand higher quality audits to enhance corporate monitoring, and that short-
term institutional ownership  is positively associated with higher audit risk.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M40 
 
Key Words: Audit quality; Institutional ownership; Monitoring; Audit risk; 
Corporate governance  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
  
In this study, we examine how changes in institutional ownership can affect the overall quality and 
perceived risk of external audits. The separation of ownership and control within a corporation results in a 
classic agency problem where the interests of shareholders and managers are not perfectly aligned. 
Corporate governance mechanisms (such as, boards of directors, external audits, and compensation 
contracts) are established to assuage the concerns of capital providers that their funds will be mismanaged 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Shleifer and Vishney (1986) claim that 
institutional investors, by virtue of their large shareholdings, have incentives to monitor corporate 
performance, because they potentially benefit the most from this monitoring1 and enjoy greater voting 
power that facilitates corrective action when necessary.2  Also due to their fiduciary responsibilities, 
institutional investors have an incentive to ensure that the firm makes corporate decisions that will 
maximize shareholder wealth (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980, Bushee 2001, David et al. 2001). 
However, prior evidence is mixed on the effectiveness of institutions to govern managers. While 
some research supports the view that institutions can effectively monitor management (e.g., Kaplan and 
Minton 1994, Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002), other studies provide evidence that suggests otherwise (e.g., 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, Black 1998, Parrino, Sias, and Starks 2003). For example, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) do not find any evidence that institutional ownership is associated with improved 
corporate performance.3 These latter results are somewhat counter intuitive in that institutional investors 
have both incentives and ability to advise the firm to improve corporate governance.   
                                                 
1 Consistent with this notion, Grossman and Hart (1980) note that monitoring management by small shareholders is not cost effective. 
2 Examples of corrective actions that large shareholders can pursue include sponsoring shareholder proposals that directly affect management 
behavior, and voting against specific proposals introduced by management. In addition, the threat by institutional investors of “voting with 
their feet” serves as a significant incentive for management to behave in the best interests of shareholders. 
3  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine seven control mechanisms: insider shareholdings, institutional holdings, shareholdings by 
blockholders, the use of outsiders on the board of directors, debt financing, the external labor market for managers, and the market for 
corporate control. 
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Institutional investors are known to influence various important corporate decisions (e.g., Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986, Hartzell and Starks 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests that as major (and often active) 
shareholders, institutional investors can make specific recommendations about the firm’s operations and 
vote on the board’s decisions such as the choice of external auditor (Council of Institutional Investor 
2008): they often make specific requests to audit committees as to how an audit is to be conducted and 
influence the decisions of audit committees, who appoint and compensate the auditor.4 The Council of 
Institutional Investor Corporate Governance Policies (2008) state “in case the board’s selection of auditor 
fails to achieve the support of a majority of the for-and-against votes cast, the audit committee should: (1) 
take the shareholders’ views into consideration and reconsider its choice of auditor: and (2) solicit the 
views of major shareholders in order to determine why broad levels of shareholder support were not 
achieved.”  
In this paper, we examine whether the presence of high institutional ownership induces the firm to 
contract for a high quality audit; a notion that has received little attention in the literature. The auditing 
function can reduce misreporting of accounting information and thus, is a valuable form of monitoring 
used by firms to reduce agency costs (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Fan 
and Wong 2002, Khurana and Raman 2004, Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008). Hence, institutional investors 
that are interested in monitoring the firm might encourage the firm’s audit committee to adopt high quality 
audits as a cost-effective monitoring device. While prior studies extensively examine the role of 
institutional investors in monitoring managers, there is little evidence on how they monitor the firm 
through influencing its audit choices, which is made by the audit committee. Our study fills this void in 
the literature.  
                                                 
4 For instance, institutions are known to request a careful examination of certain disclosure items such as off-balance sheet transactions and 
special purpose entities, as well as complicated footnotes (Leone 2002). 
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Prior research shows that different types of institutions face different incentives to monitor the firm. 
Porter (1992) argues that “short-term” or “transient” institutional owners, who hold small stakes in 
numerous firms and trade frequently in and out of stocks, create pressure for short-term earnings 
performance. These institutions are known to base their trades on a value proxy such as current earnings 
and frequently sell out of a firm with disappointing earnings news, creating incentives for managers to 
avoid earnings disappointments. In contrast, Porter (1992) argues that “long-term” or “dedicated” owners 
alleviate pressures for myopic investment behavior because their holdings provide incentives to monitor 
managers. Similarly, Dobrzynski (1993) and Monks and Minow (1995) argue that institutions that invest 
in firms with the intention of holding substantial ownership blocks over a long horizon have stronger 
incentives to monitor the firm. Taken together, it is likely that the demand for high quality audits as a 
corporate governance mechanism is driven primarily by long-term institutional ownership.  
We also examine how institutional ownership affects audit pricing, which has been shown in prior 
research to be a function of auditor effort and perceived audit risk (e.g., Simunic 1980). 5 Auditors will 
charge higher fees as the required effort to effectively audit the client increases (due to firm complexity, 
increased regulation, and other factors). Also, auditors will charge fee premiums when they perceive a 
higher risk associated with the audit to compensate for an increased probability of litigation. Thus, to the 
extent that auditors recognize the pressures exhibited on management by transient institutional investors to 
meet short-term earnings targets, we should observe this factor being priced into the audit fee. This line of 
reasoning leads us to predict that audit fees will be positively related to short-term (but not long-term) 
institutional ownership.      
                                                 
5 Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) include total institutional ownership percentage as a control variable in their audit 
fee model (level specification) and find that the coefficient on institutional ownership is insignificant. Mitra, Hossain, and Deis (2007) also do 
not find compelling evidence that institutional ownership relates to audit fees. However, neither of these studies control for the type of 
institutional investors. Further, the possible endogeneity between audit fees and institutional ownership in the level specifications complicates 
the interpretation of the results.   
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In testing our hypotheses, the potential endogeneity in institutional ownership and audit properties 
poses a challenge. In fact, controlling for endogeneity in ownership research is notoriously difficult (e.g., 
Chenhall and Moers 2007, Larcker and Rusticus 2007a, Larcker and Rusticus 2007b). The endogeneity 
problem arises in our case because the observed variability in audit properties may be due to the nature of 
ownership as we hypothesize but also, the level of institutional ownership could vary according to audit 
properties, such as audit quality. As Larcker and Rusticus (2007b) note, while instrumental variable 
estimation is the standard solution to mitigating the inconsistency in parameter estimates caused by 
endogeneity, the appropriateness of this method is questionable due mainly to locating exogeneous 
instrumental variables. Accordingly, we employ a model that examines the relation between changes in 
institutional ownership and changes in audit properties. This model specification is less likely to be 
susceptible to endogeneity (e.g., Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005).6 Nontheless, as a sensitivity test, we also 
employ the instrumental variables approach using two-stage least squares for our changes model to 
complement our OLS estimation.     
Consistent with prior research (e.g., DeAngelo 1981, Teoh and Wong 1993, Khurana and Raman 
2004, Behn et al.2008), our proxy for the demand for high quality audit is whether the firm employs a Big 
4 external auditor. In our sample of U.S. firms, we find a significantly positive association between 
auditor changes (from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor) and changes in long-term, but not short-term, 
institutional ownership. This result is consistent with our hypothesis of effective monitoring by long-term 
investors. We also find a significantly positive association between changes in auditor fees and changes in 
short-term (but not long-term) institutional ownership. This evidence suggests that short-term institutional 
ownership captures a risk characteristic that auditors recognize and price into their audits . Transient 
                                                 
6The changes specification produces more conservative tests than the levels specification because time-series variation in institutional 
ownership is likely to be smaller than the cross-sectional variation, which reduces the power of our tests. Change models are also less 
vulnerable to omitted correlated variable problems. 
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institutional investors are known to put pressure on management to meet short-term earnings targets, 
which can increase the likelihood of financial misreporting.   
This study contributes to the literature by showing that one of the ways in which long-term 
institutional investors play a monitoring role is through influencing the firm’s audit committee to adopt 
high quality external audits. By doing so, institutional investors can delegate the role of direct monitoring 
to auditors (the “delegation” hypothesis) and thereby, distribute the costs of this activity to all 
shareholders within the firm. In contrast, we do not observe such an association with short-term 
institutional ownership, consistent with prior research indicating that short-term institutions have little 
incentive to monitor management (Porter 1992). We also contribute to the literature by showing that short-
term institutional ownership is associated with audit fees. There is a paucity of evidence in the extant 
literature on how auditors price the implications of different types of corporate ownership. Our evidence is 
consistent with the view that auditors perceive an increase in audit risk that can accompany pressures 
placed on management by transient institutional investors to meet short-term earnings targets, which can 
increase the likelihood of financial misstatements.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 outlines the research methodology, 
and we discuss the empirical findings in Section 5.  
2.  Prior literature and hypothesis development 
 
In this section, we review the related prior literature and develop empirically testable hypotheses. 
Research shows that institutional investors who tend to hold larger portions of a firm’s shares have 
incentives to monitor corporate performance because they potentially benefit the most from this 
monitoring (Grossman and Hart 1980, Brickley, Lease and Smith 1988, Shleifer and Vishney 1997). 
Grossman and Hart (1980) note that monitoring firms is not cost effective for small shareholders. 
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Examples of corrective actions that large shareholders (such as institutional investors) can pursue include 
sponsoring shareholder proposals that directly affect corporate decisions, and voting against specific 
proposals introduced by management. In addition, the threat by institutional investors of “voting with their 
feet” serves as a significant incentive for management to behave in the best interests of shareholders. 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) note that institutional investors owning relatively large blocks of stock 
will internalize more of the benefits from participation in the voting process. Similarly, Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1987) and Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) report that institutional investors are more likely to vote 
against harmful amendments that reduce shareholder wealth. Jensen (1993) and Shleifer and Vishney 
(1997) argue that institutional investors play a crucial role in a well-functioning governance system 
because they have the financial interest and independence to view firm management and policies in an 
unbiased manner, and they have the power to pressure management to eliminate self-serving behavior. 
They further note that institutional monitoring is feasible due to the size of their holdings and the 
institution’s ability to effect change through their voting blocks. 7  
As Porter (1992) suggests, however, the monitoring role of institutions might be confined to long-
term institutions, which have an incentive to monitor the firm. In fact, Coffee (1991) notes that some 
institutional investors may have incentives to sell their stock due to poor performance rather than initiate 
corrective action. Similarly, Black (1990) and Admati, Phleiderer, and Zechner (1994) note that free-
riding among institutional investors can reduce their incentives to monitor management. While these 
studies do not separate institutional investor types, these arguments seem descriptive of short-term 
institutional investors. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the associations between corporate performance and seven 
governance mechanisms; insider shareholdings, institutional holdings, shareholdings by blockholders, the 
                                                 
7 For example, in the early 1990s, some institutional investors (i.e., the California Public Employees Pension Fund (CalPERS), Putnam 
Management, and J.P. Morgan) lobbied for the removal of CEOs at several large, poorly performing firms, including Kodak, IBM, 
Westinghouse, Borden, American Express, and GM (Kahn and Winton, 1998). 
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use of outsiders on the board of directors, debt financing, the external labor market for managers, and the 
market for corporate control. The authors find no evidence that corporate governance mechanisms are 
positively associated with performance. In contrast, Bushee et al. (2007) examine institutional investor 
preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. They report that the level of ownership by institutions 
that are sensitive to corporate governance is associated with past and contemporaneous changes in 
governance mechanisms, which suggests that institutional investors vote with their feet by investing in 
companies that have favorable mechanisms already in place.8 However, they also find an improvement in 
shareholder rights following an increased ownership in these types of institutions. 
The demand for quality audits arises due at least in part to agency conflicts. Agency theory posits 
that information asymmetry between a principal (stakeholder) and an agent (management) creates a moral 
hazard problem, which is the concern that an agent will pursue his/her own self-interest at the expense of 
the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Under the theory, agents and 
principals recognize that reducing moral hazard by aligning shareholder and manager interests is mutually 
beneficial. An external audit contributes to financial reporting credibility by providing an independent 
assessment of the accuracy and fairness with which financial statements represent the results of operations, 
financial position, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (e.g., 
Abdel-Khalik and Solomon 1988). Prior evidence suggests that higher quality audits are associated with 
higher earnings response coefficients (Teoh and Wong 1993), lower cost of equity capital (Khurana and 
Raman 2004), and more predictable earnings streams (Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008). Fan and Wong (2002) 
document that when a firm has agency conflicts between controlling owners and outsiders, the firm is 
more likely to adopt a high quality audit as a bonding mechanism. Thus, auditing is a valuable form of 
                                                 
8 Bushee et al. (2007) claim that extant research that examines institutional investors’ governance functions tend to lack power because not all 
types of institutions actively play monitoring roles. 
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monitoring used by firms to reduce agency costs with providers of capital (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Watts and Zimmerman 1983).   
To the extent that institutional investors attempt to constrain managerial opportunism and to 
induce the firm to make decisions that maximize shareholder wealth, institutional investors likely will 
encourage the firm to further adopt monitoring devices, such as a high quality audit. By doing so, 
institutions can delegate the actual task of monitoring to auditors, and the cost of such monitoring is borne 
by all shareholders within the firm (the “delegation” hypothesis). Thus, we expect that changes in the 
ownership level by long-term institutional investors, who are concerned about the firm’s long-term 
performance and therefore committed to monitoring it, will result in changes in audit quality. However, 
there is little reason to observe a similar relation for short-term institutional investors, whose primary 
interest is in short-term capital gains.9   
Based on the previous discussions, we predict a positive association between changes in long-term 
institutional ownership and the likelihood that managers will change from engaging a non-Big 4 auditor to 
employing a Big 4 auditor, which is our proxy for audit quality.10 Big 4 auditors differentiate themselves 
from other auditors by investing more in reputational capital (Betty 1989).  Furthermore, Big 4 auditors 
are viewed as providing higher quality audits for two primary reasons.  First, they are perceived as having 
greater competence by virtue of their substantial investments in auditor training programs and technology.  
Second, they are perceived as having greater independence by virtue of their size and large portfolio 
clients, which presumably gives them the ability to challenge their clients’ positions or walk away from 
the engagement, if necessary (Khurana and Raman 2004). Based on our measures for audit quality, we 
phrase our first hypothesis as follows: 
                                                 
9 We do not claim that short-term institutional investors are unconcerned about corporate governance.  Governance mechanisms already in 
place may very well influence short-term institutional investors’ trading decisions.  However, we conjecture that transient investors are 
unlikely to be able to effect changes in corporate governance given their short-term positions. 
10 Our analysis departs from Kane and Velury (2002), who document an association between total institutional ownership level and auditor 
size, in that we examine possible effects of different monitoring incentives of institutions (depending on their investment horizon), after 
controlling for endogeneity. 
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H1: Changes in long-term institutional ownership is positively associated with subsequent changes in 
audit quality (Big 4/Non-Big 4). 
 Our next hypothesis examines how auditors price an audit in the presence of institutional holdings. 
In general, auditor pricing is known to be a function of audit complexity, which affects the amount of 
effort expended on the audit, and the level of risk (e.g, Simunic 1980, Palmrose 1986). We investigate 
whether audit pricing is affected by the level and type of institutional ownership. In particular, we 
examine if auditors charge a fee premium when short-term institutional ownership is high. Porter (1992) 
notes that pressures for myopic investment behavior are created by “transient” institutional owners, who 
hold small stakes in numerous firms and trade frequently in and out of stocks based on current earnings. 
Consistent with this idea, Bushee (2001) finds that stock price is affected more by near-term (long-term) 
earnings when transient (long-term) institutional ownership is high.  
Further, Bushee (1998) finds that managers are more likely to make accounting choices that mask 
firm performance in the presence of significant transient institutional holdings in the company. 
Specifically, he finds that a large proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover 
and engage in momentum trading significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to 
reverse earnings declines. Given that transient institutional investors have a vested interest in the firm’s 
short-term performance and that they have influence over managers’ decisions, short-term operating 
performance is likely to be biased upwards for firms that have high levels of transient institutional 
investors (e.g., Bushee 1998).  To the extent that auditors recognize the effect of transient institutions on 
firms’ behavior to meet short-term earnings targets, auditors will likely price this increased audit risk into 
their fees. Thus, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2:  Changes in short-term institutional ownership is positively associated with changes in audit fees. 
3.  Research Design 
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3.1 Model Specification 
We examine the general relation between institutional ownership and audit properties by 
estimating regression equations where auditor changes and changes in audit fees are the dependent 
variables.  While auditor changes occur infrequently, the change specification is less susceptible to a 
potential endogeneity problem. In a levels specification, it is not clear whether a positive association 
between institutional ownership and audit quality is due to monitoring or an institutional preference for 
firms with high quality audits in place. The change specification reduces this concern as it is less likely 
that institutions change their trading position because the firm changes the auditor in the future.  
Furthermore, Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) suggest that change specifications do a better job in 
controlling for the endogeneity induced by omitted variables. Therefore, the change specification provides 
more direct evidence on the influence of institutional investors on audit quality. To test whether changes 
in institutional ownership relates to changes in audit properties, we estimate the following regression 
equations: 
tttt ControlsINSTAUDITOR εγγ +Δ+Δ+=Δ 10      (1) 
tttt ControlsINSTAFEE εδδ +Δ+Δ+=Δ 10       (2) 
The first dependent variable, ∆AUDITOR is set equal to one (negative one) when firms change from (to) a 
non-Big 4 auditor to (from) a Big 4 auditor in fiscal year t, and zero when no change in auditor takes place. 
Since auditor changes are discrete events and changes to big auditors are considered better than changes to 
non-big auditors, we use the ordered logit model in estimating Equation (1). The second dependent 
variable, ∆AFEE is measured as the natural logarithm of the change in total audit fees from fiscal year t-1 
to year t and Equation (2) is estimated using OLS. The key independent variable, ∆INST, is measured as 
12 
 
the change in the beginning-of-fiscal-year institutional ownership from year t-1 to year t. 11  The 
coefficients on ∆INST (γ1 and δ1) test whether changes in total institutional ownership are associated with 
a subsequent change in auditors and audit fees.  However, as indicated in our hypotheses development, not 
all institutions are likely to have the same incentives to monitor managers. To account for the 
heterogeneous incentives of institutional investors and to test our hypotheses, we follow prior research 
(e.g., Dikolli et al., 2006) by dividing institutional investors into two subgroups based on the length of 
their investment horizons as follows:  
ttttt ControlsLTINSTSTINSTAUDITOR εααα +Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ __ 210   (3) 
ttttt ControlsLTINSTSTINSTAFEE εβββ +Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ __ 210   (4) 
The literature on auditor choice and audit fees is large, which provides us with extensive guidance on 
what variables to include as controls (e.g, Palmrose 1986; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and 
Raghunandan 2003; Khurana and Raman 2004). When ΔAUDITOR is the dependent variable, we control 
for changes in short-term accruals, long-term accruals, and sales (∆SHORT, ∆LONG, ΔSALES) as larger 
accruals and sales revenues require higher quality audit service by Big 4 auditors. ∆SHORT (∆LONG) is 
the change in the absolute value of short-term (long-term) accruals in net income12 and ∆SALES is 
measured as the change in the natural logarithm of annual total sales from year t-1 to year t. We also 
include the annual change in leverage (∆LEV), where leverage is measured as the end-of-year total debt to 
assets ratio, because highly levered firms are more likely to raise capital, which might influence their 
preference for a Big 4 auditor to verify their financial statements as well as a proxy for risk. For a similar 
reason, we control for changes in the firm’s financing activities (∆ISSUE) by using a dummy variable set 
                                                 
11 Because institutional ownership is changing throughout the period and is filed with the SEC on a calendar quarter basis, we examine the 
sensitivity of our results to various alternative measures; such as, the average ownership balance of 4 quarters during the year, and the average 
of the beginning and ending balances for the year. Our results are not sensitive to our choices of alternative ownership measures. 
12 Short-term (SHORT) and long-term (LONG) accruals are defined as: SHORT = Absolute value of: [∆(Current assets - Cash) - ∆(Current 
liabilities – Current long-term debt)] / Sales; LONG = Absolute value of: [Depreciation + ∆Deferred charges + ∆deferred taxes] / Sales. See 
Table 1 for more details. 
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equal to 1 when the firm issued equity or long-term debt during the year that is greater than 5% of total 
assets.13 We include various proxies for audit risk as they are known to affect both auditors’ client 
acceptance decisions and audit fee pricing (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, 
and Raghunandan 2003). These variables are the natural logarithm of a firm’s end-of-year equity book-to-
market ratio (∆LNBM), and the natural logarithm of a firm’s liquidity (∆LNLIQ), measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the firm’s current ratio at the end of year t.  To control for profitability, we include a 
firm’s return on assets (∆ROA), measured as a firm’s annual operating income before depreciation in year 
t, divided by end-of-period total assets. We also include the restatement variable (ΔRESTAT) and the 
auditor change variable (ΔADT_ALL) since audit fee changes could be due to restatements or/and 
differences in the successor auditor’s audit fee model, and not by changes in the fundamentals of the 
firm.14  
In addition to the above control variables that are included in the auditor changes model, the 
literature provides additional guidance on audit fee determinants, which are related to the size and 
complexity of the business operations of the audited firm (e.g., Palmrose 1986; Whisenant et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, when ΔAFEE is the dependent variable, we include the following additional controls (all are 
measured as of fiscal year end): 15 
∆ASSET = change in natural logarithm of total assets,  
∆EMPL = change in the square root of the total number of employees, 
ΔN_SEG = change in the natural logarithm of one plus the number of business segments and 
geographic segments,  
ΔINVREC = change in the sum of inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets,  
                                                 
13Since a firm’s auditor choice may be affected by whether they have an issuance or not, we replace the change in issuance variable (∆ISSUE) 
with the dummy variable for issuance (ISSUE) and do the same exercises. We find virtually identical results. 
14 The auditor changes variable (∆ADT_ALL) used as an independent variable is different from ∆AUDITOR in that it includes within-group 
(BIG4 and NON-Big4) changes. 
15 In addition, we control for changes in the standard determinants of total, short-term, and long-term institutional ownership such as beta, 
dividend-to-price, and book-to-price in the 2-stage least square technique. See 5.4.1 for more details. 
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ΔFOROPS = change in the indicator variable whether the firm has foreign operations, and  
∆LOSS = change in the indicator variable whether the firm incurs a loss in year t.  
∆M&A = change in the indicator variable whether the firm has mergers and acquisitions in year t.  
In addition, because our sample period overlaps the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 
which extends the responsibility of auditors and could influence management choices and fees, we control 
for changes in the regulatory environment by including year dummy variables in both models. Finally, we 
control for industry fixed effects in both models.  All regression variables are summarized in Table 1.   
 
4.  Sample and Data 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The initial sample used in this study consists of all firm-year observations for the period 2001 to 
2005. Data on institutional ownership are obtained from the Thomson Financial database, which provides 
ownership data from actual forms filed with the SEC on a quarterly basis by money managers and 
management companies.16 We construct firm level ownership data from the money manager level data 
provided by the database. We collect a firm’s current auditor, auditor changes, and audit fees data from 
Audit Analytics. Accounting and stock price data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial, 
Research, and Full Coverage files, and the CRSP Monthly and Daily files.  
The final sample consists of all firms for which data are available for (1) current and prior period 
institutional ownership, (2) total audit fees and auditor identity in the Audit Analytics database; and (3) 
the complete set of variables used in the empirical analyses. These data criteria result in a final sample of 
12,683 firm/year observations. The actual number of observations used in some tests is smaller due to 
specific data requirements and missing variables. 
                                                 
16 The forms filed with the SEC that provide ownership information include 3, 4, 13D, 13F, 13G, and 14D. 
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4.2 Measurement of Institutional Ownership 
The Securities and Exchange Act, as amended in 1976, requires all financial institutions that have 
equity assets under management of $100 million or more to report their holdings to the SEC for any 
common stock position greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000. Institutions included in this category are 
banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, investment advisors, and other (e.g., university endowments 
and pensions). We use the percentage of institutional investors’ total share ownership as a proxy for 
incentives by sophisticated outside investors to monitor the firm’s decisions. We measure institutional 
ownership at the beginning of each fiscal year. When classifying institutional ownership by type of 
investment horizon, we follow the procedures as outlined in Bushee (1998). Short-term institutional 
ownership is based on Bushee’s (1998) measure of transient institutions, whereas long-tem institutional 
ownership is the sum of dedicated and quasi-indexer ownership.  
4.3 Auditor Identity, Auditor Changes, and Audit Fees 
We use both auditor identity and auditor changes data from the Current Auditor and Auditor 
Change files from the Audit Analytics database.17 These auditor properties data are preferred to that 
available from COMPUSTAT (which has been employed in several prior studies) for the following 
reasons. First, as Barton (2004) shows, auditor identity information in COMPUSTAT contains errors, 
especially for former Arthur Andersen clients. Second, it is well known that second-tier auditors (such as 
BDO Seidman and Grant Thornton) in COMPUSTAT are sometimes misclassified. Finally, since Audit 
                                                 
17 We focus on auditor changes and do not distinguish between auditor dismissal and resignation for the following reason. The demand side 
argument suggests that a firm can dismiss the incumbent auditor and switch to a higher quality auditor in response to institutional investor 
demand. In contrast, the supply side view suggests that in the presence of strong institutional monitoring, smaller (non-Big N) auditors that 
are unable to compensate adequately for the additional audit effort demanded by the institutions might choose to voluntarily resign (and only 
large auditors that are able to justify the higher fees from exerting more audit effort will accept the client). Either scenario would be consistent 
with stronger institutional monitoring of the firm would leading to a higher quality audit. 
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Analytics provides the Audit Fees, Current Auditors, and Auditor Changes files separately, it is easy for 
us to verify across files the accuracy of the auditor identity and the audit changes. 18   
To determine changes in auditor choice (Big 4 versus non-Big 4) across firms, we use the Current 
Auditors and Auditor Changes files available from the Audit Analytics database.19 We compared each 
year’s auditor key in the Current Auditors file with the dismissed and engaged auditor key in the Auditor 
Changes file to ensure the accuracy of the auditor change year. 
4.4 Sample Characteristics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests. 
The mean (median) value for changes in total institutional ownership is 3.23% (0.13%). The mean 
(median) value for changes in short-term (long-term) institutional ownership is -1.41% (3.22%).20 Since 
the changes in shareholdings are more frequent for short-term institutional investors, the standard 
deviation of changes in ownership is larger for short-term institutions (13.10%) than long-term institutions 
(12.39%). Panel B of Table 2 illustrates time trends of auditor changes. Note that changes from Big 4 to 
non-Big 4 auditors have increased significantly after the year 2002, while the total auditor changes have 
decreased.  This finding suggests that the audit market has experienced structural changes since the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.21  
Panel C of Table 2 reports Pearson correlations among variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The association between changes in auditors (∆AUDITOR) and changes in audit fees (∆AFEE) is positive 
                                                 
18 Considering the importance of auditor identity data in our empirical analysis, we randomly selected former Arther Anderson clients and the 
second-tier auditors’ clients and compared the accuracy of the data using source files, such as, 8-K and 10-K, and found that the Audit 
Analytics data are more accurate than COMPUSTAT and are not subject to misclassification problems. 
19 In order to control for the effect of non-voluntary auditor changes (e.g., Arthur Anderson clients, mergers and acquisitions) and their effect 
on audit fees, we try various sensitivity checks. The results are provided in Section 5.   
20 The untabulated descriptive statistics show that the mean (median) values for total, transient, and long-term institutional ownership are 
43.13% (43.75%), 16.56%(14.63%), and 24.54%(23.08%), which are comparable to prior studies (e.g., Bushee and Goodman, 2007). 
21 Further investigation shows that auditor changes to Big4 for the year from 2001 and 2003 are mostly due to the fact that Arthur Anderson is 
classified as a non-Big4 auditor. More specifically, only 3 changes in 2001, 14 in 2002, and 12 in 2003 are the actual cases of auditor changes 
from non-Big4 to Big4 auditors. As shown in the regression analyses, our conclusions do not change when Arthur Anderson clients are 
dropped from the sample. 
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(0.0711, p-value < 0.01) and the changes in total institutional ownership (∆INST) are positively related to 
audit fee changes (AUDCG). The correlation between changes in auditors (∆AUDITOR) and changes in 
long-term institutional ownership (∆INST_LT) is significantly positive (0.0345, p-value < 0.01), and the 
correlation between changes in audit fees (∆AFEE) and changes in short-term institutional ownership 
(∆INST_ST) is significantly positive (0.0763, p-value < 0.01).  These correlations provide preliminary 
evidence consistent with our hypotheses at the univariate level. 
 
5.  Multivariate Results 
5.1 Auditor Changes and Institutional Ownership Changes 
The first column of Table 3 shows the ordered logit regression results from estimating Equation (1) 
for the full sample of 12,683 observations. Although the variable of interest (ΔINST) has the hypothesized 
positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = .113). To investigate 
further, we consider the effect of Arthur Andersen clients on our results. During our sample period, Arthur 
Andersen experienced a severe change to their reputation. At the beginning of our sample period (2001), 
one could argue that Arthur Andersen was still considered a premier auditing firm that provided an audit 
quality similar to the other big accounting firms. However, the high profile audit failures associated with 
Waste Management and especially Enron ultimately resulted in the demise of the firm.  Sometime during 
our sample period, the ramifications of changing to or from Arthur Andersen completely changed.  
Accordingly, we assess the impact of Arthur Andersen clients on our overall results by eliminating 
these observations from our analysis and report the results in the second column of Table 3. For this 
reduced sample of 11,770 firm-year observations, we find that changes in institutional ownership (∆INST) 
are positively associated with future auditor changes (∆AUDITOR), which suggests that institutional 
investors prefer Big 4 auditors and they discourage firms from changing to smaller, non-Big 4 auditors; 
presumably, because these smaller auditors provide lower quality audit services. Assuming that Big 4 
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auditors enhance financial reporting reliability, this result confirms prior studies’ evidence on the positive 
role of institutional investors on the quality of financial disclosure (e.g., Bushee and Noe 2001). The 
change in significance that we document after eliminating the Arthur Andersen observations reinforces the 
notion that treating Arthur Andersen auditors as either high or low quality during our sample period can 
result in measurement error because of the significant change in the perception of their audits during our 
sample period.   
5.2 Audit Fee Changes and Institutional Ownership Changes 
In the last three columns of Table 3, we report results from estimating equation (2) using three 
different samples: the full sample, the subsample excluding Arthur Andersen observations, and the 
subsample containing only Big 4 clients.22 These results show that the coefficients on changes in total 
institutional ownership (∆INST) are all positive and statistically significant when regressed on changes in 
audit fees (∆AFEE).23 This result could be due either to institutional investors demanding higher quality 
audits by a Big4 auditor or auditors perceiving higher audit risk (hence charging higher fees) when 
institutional ownership is high. We try to distinguish between these two potential explanations in the next 
section, where we separately examine short-term and long-term institutional holdings.  
5.3 Type of Institutional Ownership and Auditor Changes 
 Prior studies show that not all institutions have the same incentives to monitor the firm (e.g., 
Bushee 1998, 2001, Gaspar et al. 2005). As can be seen in the Pearson correlation in Table 2, institutional 
ownership with a short-term investment horizon is fundamentally different from institutional ownership 
with a long-term horizon. For example, the correlation coefficients between the types of institutional 
                                                 
22 The BIG4 only sample includes auditees of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 
23 These results are consistent with the demand side argument of audit fee pricing, which we use to develop the hypothesis. The supply side 
argument, which our results are not consistent with, predicts that the relation between institutional ownership and audit fees will be negative, 
i.e., auditors would charge less fees when external monitoring is strong, ceteris paribus. However, since these two forces affect the association 
in the opposite directions, the interpretation should be based on the type of institutional investors that is related to monitoring incentives. See 
the next section for more discussion about this issue.  
19 
 
ownership and changes in stock issuance (∆ISSUE) suggests that short-term institutional investors prefer 
firms with high financing demand while long-term institutions do not have this positive relation.  
Results from estimating Equation (3), which tests our hypotheses, are shown in the first two 
columns of Table 4. Consistent with our reasoning, we find that the significantly positive relation between 
audit quality and institutional ownership documented in Table 3 is driven entirely by long-term 
institutional investors.  That is, the coefficient on ∆INST_ST is not significantly different from zero; 
whereas, the coefficient on ∆INST_LT is significant for both the full sample and the subsample that 
excludes Arthur Andersen observations. 24  This result is consistent with the view that long-term 
institutional investors are more committed to improving financial reporting quality by using measures that 
have long-term implications such as auditor changes, while short-term institutions do not have the same 
incentives to do so.  
In the last three columns of Table 4, we report results from estimating Equation (4) using three 
different samples. For all three samples, the coefficient on short-term institutional ownership (∆INST_ST) 
is significantly positive at the 1% level while the coefficient on long-term institutional ownership 
(∆INST_LT) is not significantly different from zero. Thus, this result suggests that perceived audit risk is 
driven entirely by short-term institutional investors.  
Overall, the results suggest, together with the findings from the auditor change model, that 
transient institutional investors who put more weight on short-term gains in their transactions are 
associated with increased audit risk and thereby, increase audit fees. In contrast, long-term institutional 
investors are associated with more structural changes in the monitoring systems by influencing the audit 
committee to choose Big 4 auditors, who provide higher quality audit services. These results show that 
institutional investors have heterogeneous incentives, and classification of institutional investors based on 
                                                 
24 There are 40 cases of switching from Arthur Anderson to Non-Big 4 auditors and the magnitude of changes in long-term institutional 
ownership is much smaller (2.61%). 
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the length of their investment horizons successfully captures the effect of this heterogeneity on audit 
properties. 
5.4 Additional Analyses 
5.4.1 Big4 vs. Non-Big4 Changes 
To further examine long-term institutional investors’ preference for high quality audits, we divide 
the sample into four sub-samples using the type of auditor changes – changes to Big4, changes to non-
Big4, changes within Big4, and changes within Non-Big4 and exercise logit analysis using each type of 
auditor changes sample separately. The result is shown in Table 5. We find that the significantly positive 
association in regression equation 1 is mainly driven by the negative association between changes in long-
term institutional ownership and changes from Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 auditors. Specifically, the 
coefficient on ∆INST_LTt is negative and significant only in the Big 4 to non-Big 4 subsample (the second 
column of Table 6), indicating that when a firm’s long-term institutional ownership increases, the firm is 
less likely to switch its auditor from a Big 4 to non-Big 4. However, for firms that switch the auditor from 
a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 (the first column in the Table), ∆INST_LTt is insignificant, implying that an 
increase in long-term institutional ownership does not lead to auditor switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4. 
We find no significant association in within-group changes samples. These results suggest that long-term 
institutions’ effect on commitment to high quality audit seems to come from inducing firms to retain a 
high quality auditor rather than to switch them to a high quality auditor.  
5.4.2 Direction of Causality 
 We have argued that the direction of causality is from changes in institutional ownership to 
changes in auditors and audit fees in the future. An important research design that facilitates this 
interpretation is the fact that we measure changes in institutional ownership over a period that ends at the 
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beginning of year t, and changes in auditor characteristics are measured during year t.  Nevertheless, we 
cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the higher quality audit services by Big 4 auditors may attract 
institutional investors and therefore, the positive association we find may be due to causality in the 
opposite direction. In order to provide further evidence on this issue, we examine whether the changes in 
auditors or audit fees are correlated with future changes in institutional ownership using the following 
regressions:  
tttt ControlsAUDITORINST εαα +Δ+Δ+=Δ + 101      (5) 
tttt ControlsAFEEINST εββ +Δ+Δ+=Δ + 101      (6) 
This result is reported in Table 6. Following prior literature, we include additional control 
variables such as market value of equity, R&D intensity, divided yield, market beta, and 3- and 9-month 
stock return momentum for this test. We find that all auditor change and audit fee change models show no 
statistically significant associations with the future change in institutional ownership. Thus, the direction 
of causality is likely to go from institutional monitoring to audit characteristics, as indicated in our 
primary results, but not vice versa. 
5.4.3 Other Issues 
We carry out several additional sensitivity checks in this section. First, while it is likely that the 
changes specifications we employ throughout the study are more conservative than levels specifications 
and that they alleviate the concern of endogeneity, we estimate our main regression models using a two 
stage least squares approach.25 For this purpose, we use control variables in Table 6, as well as lagged 
                                                 
25 As stated earlier, this approach has some caveats. First, it is difficult to identify instrument variables that are orthogonal to the error term in 
the equation but are closely related to the variable in doubt (in this case, variables that are closely related to institutional ownership but are not 
related to auditor choice or audit fee related dependent variables). Second, if unobserved firm-specific characteristics are directly associated 
with both dependent and independent variables but both variables have no direct effect on each other, then the relationship between the 
variables could be spurious. Although the changes model we use in this paper could alleviate the first problem, the second problem is still in 
question. In order to control for the unobservable heterogeneity problem, we use a panel data fixed-effect estimator to obtain consistent 
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institutional ownership change,26 as instruments in the first stage. Untabulated results show that our main 
findings remain the same. These results, combined with the results from the direction of causality tests 
discussed in Section 5.4.2, further enhance the internal validity of the study.    
Another potential confounding effect is the possibility that the effect of institutional ownership 
change is dependent on the level of institutional ownership. In other words, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the monitoring effect of institutional ownership varies systematically depending on the 
existing level of institutional ownership. To investigate this issue, we partition the sample into high and 
low institutional ownership groups using the median total institutional ownership percentage cutoff, and 
run regression equations (3) and (4) separately in the two sub-samples. Consistent with our previous 
results, long-term institutional ownership loads positively and significantly in both sub-samples, whereas 
short-term institutional ownership does not load in either sample. These results suggest that our inference 
is not sensitive to the existing level of institutional ownership.  
6.  Conclusion 
 External audits play an important role in the capital market by ensuring financial statement users 
that reported results are consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (e.g., Palmrose 1988). 
Research shows that high quality audits improve earnings predictability (Behn et al. 2008) and enhance 
the information content of earnings (Teoh and Wong 1993). As such, determinants of a high quality audit 
and audit fees are of interest to financial statement users. In this study, our focus is on institutional 
holdings. Academics have examined whether and how institutional ownership affects firm behavior by 
analyzing the relation between institutional ownership and a variety of firms’ decisions; such as, 
investment, financing, corporate governance, and financial reporting choices (see Chen 2007 for a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
coefficient estimates, assuming that the unobservable industry or firm characteristics are relatively constant over time. The results are 
virtually the same. 
26 Adding a lag term is a frequent choice for the instrument variable when the error term is auto-correlated (e.g., Hansen and Singleton, 1982).  
See Greene (1997) for more details.   
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literature review). The large and growing presence of institutional investors in the capital markets has 
important implications for firms’ decisions as their behavior can have significant economic consequences 
(e.g., Bushee 1998, Bushee 2001, Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005). However, the mechanism through 
which institutions monitor the firm and improve governance is not well understood. More importantly, 
there is little evidence on how corporate monitoring by institutional investors relates to auditor choice and 
audit pricing. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on these issues. 
Our results suggest that one of the ways by which dedicated long-term institutions monitor 
management is through inducing firms to commit to a higher quality audit. Moreover, we find that only 
certain types of institutions – those with a long-term stake in the firm - have an incentive to monitor 
management and thereby, demand a higher quality audit by a Big 4 auditor. This result suggests that the 
monitoring role of institutional investors is related to their investment horizon: long-term institutions, but 
not short-term institutions, provide some “indirect” monitoring by encouraging the firm to improve 
corporate governance through the adoption of high quality audits. However, we do not observe such an 
association with short-term institutional ownership, in line with the idea that transient short-term 
institutions, which do not have long-term commitment to the firm, have little incentive to monitor the firm 
operations (e.g., Porter 1992). 
Next, our evidence provides insight into the auditors’ perception of how stock holdings by 
institutional investors relate to audit risk. We document that auditors charge a fee premium as the 
ownership percentage of short-term institutional investors increases. This result is consistent with the view 
that auditors perceive the ownership by short-term institutions as creating pressure on mangers to report 
short-term earnings that meet earnings targets. To the extent that the likelihood of misstatement increases 
with the pressures exhibited by short-term institutional ownership, auditors’ litigation risk will increase 
and thus, they will exert more audit effort to reduce such risk, which has the effect of increasing the fees 
charged to the client.    
24 
 
Our results should be interpreted subject to the following caveats. First, while our evidence is 
consistent with the idea that institutional ownership induces firms to commit to a higher quality audit, it 
does not prove causality. Nonetheless, we are able to conclude, with reasonable assurance, that 
institutional ownership is not driven by audit properties. Second, as in other studies in this line of 
literature (e.g., Bushee 1998, 2001, Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005), we infer institutions’ trading 
behaviors from the changes in their annual holdings. This can be viewed as a noisy measure for the net 
trading positions of institutions on a periodic basis (Chen 2007). However, measurement error biases 
against documenting statistical significance as it lowers the power of tests to reject the null hypothesis of 
institutional monitoring and audit pricing.27 Finally, while our evidence suggests that auditors demand a 
fee premium when short-term institutional ownership is high, our audit fee data do not enable us to 
distinguish whether this result is due to auditors spending more audit hours or to auditors charging higher 
fees per hour. Whichever might be the case, the result is consistent with auditors perceiving more audit 
risk with increases in ownership by “transient” short-term institutional investors.  
                                                 
27 We assume the errors are randomly distributed across firms as there is little reason to believe that they are systematic. 
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[Table 1] Variable Definitions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
∆AUDITOR Auditor Changes to either non-Big 4 or Big 4 auditors: 1 for Changes to Big 4 Auditors and -1 for changes
 to non-Big 4 auditors; 0 otherwise. 
∆AFEE Changes in Total Audit Fee
measured by changes in the natural logarithm of Total Audit Fees. [ln(AFEEt) – ln(AFEEt-1)] 
TREATMENT VARIABLES 
∆INST Changes in Percentage of Total Institutional Ownership measured at the beginning of the year t. [INSTt –
INSTt-1] 
∆INST_ST Changes in Percentage of Institutional Ownership with a Short-term Investment Horizon. The short 
horizon ownership is measured by ownership of all transient institutional investors as classified in Bushee 
(1998). [INST_STt –INST_STt-1] 
∆INST_LT Changes in Percentage of Institutional Ownership with a Long-term Investment Horizon. The short 
horizon ownership is measured by ownership of all transient and quasi-index institutional investors as 
classified in Bushee (1998). [INST_LTt –INST_LTt-1] 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
∆SALES Changes inNatural logarithm of Sales [ln(SALEt) – ln(SALEt-1)] 
∆ASSET Changes in Natural logarithm of Total Assets [ln(ATt) – ln(ATt-1)] 
∆SHORT Changes in Absolute value of Short-term accruals. [ln(SHORTt) – ln(SHORTt-1) where SHORT = Absolu
te value of: [∆(ACT - CH) - ∆(LCT – DLTT)] / SALE] 
∆LONG Changes in Absolute value of Long-term accruals[ln(LONGt) – ln(LONGt-1) where LONG = Absolute va
lue of: [DP + ∆DC + ∆TXDITC] / SALE] 
∆LNBM C h a n g e s  i n  N a t u r a l  l o g a r i t h m  o f  B o o k - t o - M a r k e t  [ ln(B/Mt) – ln(BMt-
1) where B/M = CEQ/(CSHO*PRCC_F)] 
∆LEV Changes in Leverage, measured as debt to assets [ln(ATt) – ln(ATt-1)] 
∆LNLIQ Changes in Natural logarithm of one plus liquidity [ln(1+LIQ1)-ln(1+LIQ-1)] 
∆ISSUE Changes in Indicator variable for stock and long-term debt issuance: 1 if stock and long-term debt (SSTK 
+ DLTIS) for past three years are more than 5% of total assets at year t but not year t-1; -
1 if stock and long-term debt for past three years are more than 5% at year t-1 but not year t; 0 otherwise 
∆ROA Changes in Return on Assets [(OIADPt / ATt-1) – (OIADPt-1/ATt-2)] 
∆LOSS Changes in Indicator variable for net loss (NI): 1 for firms with net loss at year t but not year t-; -
1 for firms with net loss at year t-1 but not at year t; 0 otherwise 
∆EMPL Changes in Squared root of the number of employees [EMP2] 
∆INVREC Changes in Inventory and Account Receivables;[ln(ATt) – ln(ATt-1)]] 
∆N_SEG Changes in Natural logari thm of 1 plus the number of Business and Geographical Segments  
[ln(1+N_SEGt) – ln(1+N_SEGt-1)] 
∆FOROPS 
Changes in Indicator variable for firm with foreign operations; 1 for 
firms with starting foreign operations at year t and -1 for firms with stopping foreign operations at year t; 
0 otherwise. 
∆ADT_ALL Changes in Indicator variable for Auditor Changes including within-group (Big4 and NON-Big4); 1 for 
firms with a new auditor at t and -1 for firms with a new auditor at t-1; 0 otherwise. 
∆RESTAT Changes in Indicator variable for Restatements; 1 for firms with misstatements at 1 and -1 for firms with misstatements at t-1; 0 otherwise. 
∆M&A Changes in Indicator variable for mergers and acquisitions activities. 1 for firms with M&A activities at 1 and -1 for firms with M&A activities at t-1; 0 otherwise. 
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[Table 2] Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics among Selected Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% 
∆AUDITOR 12,683 0.0069 0.2753 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆AFEE 12,683 0.2394 0.4449 0.0021 0.1595 0.4229
∆INST 12,683 3.2337 11.3092 -0.2421 0.1332 7.3103
∆INST_ST 12,683 -1.4097 13.0960 -8.3333 0.0000 4.1667
∆INST_LT 12,683 3.2232 12.3926 -0.9524 0.0000 10.0000
∆SHORT 12,683 -0.0140 0.2979 -0.0346 -0.0022 0.0246
∆LONG 12,683 -0.0092 0.1522 -0.0142 -0.0013 0.0086
∆SALES 12,683 0.0770 0.4076 -0.0299 0.0738 0.1906
∆LNBM 12,683 -0.0566 0.6289 -0.3313 -0.0372 0.2408
∆LEV 12,683 -0.0045 0.0840 -0.0342 -0.0010 0.0102
∆LNLIQ 12,683 -0.0112 0.2869 -0.1163 -0.0020 0.1019
∆ISSUE 12,683 -0.0156 0.3168 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ASSET 12,683 0.0593 0.2807 -0.0515 0.0463 0.1537
∆ROA 12,683 0.0017 0.1336 -0.0305 0.0017 0.0328
∆LOSS 12,683 -0.0103 0.4498 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆EMPL 12,683 0.0191 0.2683 -0.0342 0.0056 0.0580
∆INVREC 12,683 -0.0025 0.0609 -0.0230 0.0000 0.0211
∆N_SEG 12,683 0.0174 0.1443 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆FOROPS  12,683 0.0069 0.2753 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ADT_ALL 12,683 0.1072 0.3093 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆RESTAT 12,683 0.0020 0.5260 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆M&A 12,683 -0.0075 0.5527 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 
Panel B: Number of Auditor Changes by Type 
CHANGE TYPE 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
BIG4 TO NON-BIG4 34 34 75 153 141 437
NON-BIG4 TO BIG4 11 444 59 7 4 525
INTER-GROUP CHANGE 45 478 134 160 145 962
WITHIN-GROUP CHANGE 31 84 99 98 85 397
TOTAL AUDITOR CHANGE 76 562 233 258 230 1,359
NO CHANGE 1,649 2,141 2,818 2,650 2,066 11,324
TOTAL 1,725 2,703 3,051 2,908 2,296 12,683
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Panel C: Pearson Correlations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[1] ∆AUDITOR 1.0000                    
[2] ∆AFEE 0.0711 1.0000                   
[3] ∆INST 0.0127 0.0780 1.0000                  
[4] ∆INST_ST -0.0063 0.0763 0.3765 1.0000                 
[5] ∆INST_LT 0.0345 -0.0051 0.3955 -0.5591 1.0000                
[6] ∆SHORT -0.0059 0.0060 -0.0225 -0.0011 -0.0187 1.0000               
[7] ∆LONG -0.0166 0.0019 -0.0229 -0.0074 -0.0135 0.3937 1.0000              
[8] ∆SALES -0.0038 0.1299 0.1190 0.0359 0.0596 -0.4498 -0.4748 1.0000             
[9] ∆LNBM 0.0576 0.0250 -0.0242 -0.0599 0.0390 -0.0162 0.0400 -0.0085 1.0000            
[10] ∆LEV 0.0062 0.0404 -0.0523 -0.0257 -0.0179 0.0236 0.0372 0.0083 -0.0907 1.0000           
[11] ∆LNLIQ -0.0078 -0.0117 0.1062 0.0464 0.0423 -0.0372 0.0209 -0.0586 0.0408 -0.1866 1.0000          
[12] ∆ISSUE -0.0024 0.0368 0.0363 0.0340 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0038 0.0344 0.0272 0.0503 0.0328 1.0000         
[13] ∆ROA -0.0006 0.0022 0.0723 0.0196 0.0439 -0.0967 -0.1335 0.2357 -0.0719 -0.1256 0.2622 -0.0115 1.0000        
[14] ∆SIZE  -0.0023 0.1923 0.2139 0.0661 0.1047 -0.0013 0.0701 0.3438 0.1414 0.1070 0.1935 0.0560 0.3238 1.0000        
[15] ∆LOSS 0.0044 0.0085 -0.0625 -0.0084 -0.0467 0.0232 0.0213 -0.1242 0.0648 0.1304 -0.1096 0.0243 -0.2823 -0.1075 1.0000       
[16] ∆EMPL -0.0052 0.0951 0.0421 0.0064 0.0231 -0.0138 0.0050 0.1730 0.0291 0.0487 -0.0432 0.0286 0.0220 0.2541 -0.0299 1.0000      
[17] ∆INVREC -0.0076 0.0099 -0.0398 -0.0458 0.0215 -0.0451 -0.0692 0.1420 -0.0999 -0.0098 -0.1756 -0.0181 0.0265 -0.2096 -0.0257 0.0269 1.0000     
[18] ∆N_SEG 0.0055 0.0247 -0.0082 0.0151 -0.0150 0.0073 -0.0021 0.0423 0.0204 0.0200 -0.0138 0.0072 0.0016 0.0657 -0.0046 0.0367 -0.0059 1.0000    
[19] ∆FOROPS -0.0099 0.0181 0.0025 0.0039 -0.0054 0.0007 0.0006 0.0219 0.0092 0.0101 -0.0232 0.0220 -0.0098 0.0158 -0.0025 0.0014 0.0077 0.0022 1.0000   
[20] ∆ADT_ALL 0.0727 -0.1343 -0.0173 -0.0102 0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0084 -0.0293 0.0310 -0.0096 -0.0038 0.0066 0.0101 -0.0435 -0.0017 -0.0251 0.0036 -0.0070 0.0093 1.0000  
[21] ∆RESTAT 0.1017 -0.0558 -0.0030 0.0431 -0.0246 0.0008 -0.0039 -0.0399 0.1013 0.0115 -0.0249 -0.0093 -0.0229 -0.0618 0.0181 -0.0225 0.0203 0.0231 -0.0060 0.0869 1.0000 
[22] ∆M&A -0.0012 0.0707 0.0212 -0.0037 0.0187 0.0285 0.0329 -0.0088 0.0072 0.0646 -0.0633 0.0236 0.0083 0.1394 0.0381 0.0533 -0.0556 0.0148 0.0033 -0.0114 0.0239 
See Table 1 for definition of variables. Correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are shown in boldface type. 
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[Table 3] Changes in Institutional Ownership and Auditor Changes 
AUDITOR CHANGE AUDIT FEE CHANGE VARIABLE 
ALL NON-AA ALL NON-AA BIG4 ONLY 
∆INSTt 0.0050 0.0096 0.0011 0.0012 0.0008 
 [1.58] [2.49]** [3.14]*** [3.22]*** [2.07]** 
∆SHORTt 0.1195 0.2315    
 [0.95] [1.39]    
∆LONGt 0.0353 0.0371    
 [0.14] [0.10]    
∆SALESt 0.3175 0.5529 0.0680 0.0717 0.0654 
 [3.20]*** [5.00]*** [5.49]*** [5.61]*** [4.98]*** 
∆LNBMt 0.0823 0.1991 0.0050 0.0078 0.0038 
 [1.35] [2.23]** [0.70] [1.07] [0.50] 
∆LEVt 0.4322 1.2198 0.0653 0.0563 0.0614 
 [0.93] [1.88]* [1.28] [1.08] [1.09] 
∆LNLIQt 0.0070 0.1518 -0.0239 -0.0224 -0.0169 
 [0.05] [0.79] [1.41] [1.28] [0.88] 
∆ISSUEt 0.0176 -0.1811 0.0268 0.0272 0.0375 
 [0.15] [1.16] [2.29]** [2.25]** [2.87]*** 
∆ROAt -0.1208 -0.5264 -0.2397 -0.2496 -0.2440 
 [0.37] [1.10] [6.46]*** [6.70]*** [5.83]*** 
∆ASSETt   0.2181 0.2113 0.2333 
   [10.49]*** [9.77]*** [10.30]*** 
∆LOSSt   0.0350 0.0330 0.0409 
   [3.83]*** [3.58]*** [4.02]*** 
∆EMPLt   0.0486 0.0511 0.0357 
   [1.71]* [1.69]* [1.34] 
∆INVRECt   0.0690 0.1184 0.1249 
   [0.98] [1.64] [1.53] 
∆N_SEGt   0.0401 0.0395 0.0104 
   [1.68]* [1.57] [0.40] 
∆FOROPSt   0.0137 0.0123 0.0171 
   [0.83] [0.74] [0.98] 
∆ADT_ALL   -0.1778 -0.2509 -0.0835 
   [11.13]*** [11.71]*** [4.45]*** 
∆RESTAT   -0.0321 -0.0331 -0.0342 
   [3.56]*** [3.66]*** [3.54]*** 
∆M&A   0.0286 0.0244 0.0255 
   [3.93]*** [3.33]*** [3.25]*** 
Intercept   0.0878 0.0778 0.0540 
   [2.63]*** [2.33]** [1.43] 
Obs. 12,683 11,770 12,683 11,770 10,244 
Pseudo R2 0.1480 0.0611    
Adjusted R2   0.1484 0.1570 0.1695 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Year and industry (2 digit SIC) dummy variables are included in all OLS regressions but not reported for 
brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. The absolute value of the t-statistics is shown in brackets.  ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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[Table 4] Type of Institutional Ownership – Short-term vs. Long-term 
AUDITOR CHANGE AUDIT FEE CHANGE VARIABLE 
ALL NON-AA ALL NON-AA BIG4 ONLY 
∆INST_STt 0.0020 -0.0006 0.0020 0.0021 0.0019 
 [0.57] [0.14] [5.15]*** [5.16]*** [4.60]*** 
∆INST_LTt 0.0073 0.0079 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
 [2.09]** [1.78]* [0.22] [0.16] [0.35] 
∆SHORTt 0.1229 0.2398    
 [0.97] [1.46]    
∆LONGt 0.0332 0.0480    
 [0.14] [0.12]    
∆SALESt 0.3195 0.5692 0.0688 0.0725 0.0660 
 [3.22]*** [5.22]*** [5.55]*** [5.68]*** [5.03]*** 
∆LNBMt 0.0770 0.1882 0.0069 0.0098 0.0068 
 [1.26] [2.09]** [0.97] [1.35] [0.88] 
∆LEVt 0.4168 1.1698 0.0692 0.0602 0.0696 
 [0.90] [1.82]* [1.36] [1.15] [1.24] 
∆LNLIQt 0.0108 0.1743 -0.0236 -0.0220 -0.0176 
 [0.08] [0.91] [1.40] [1.26] [0.92] 
∆ISSUEt 0.0213 -0.1722 0.0258 0.0262 0.0364 
 [0.18] [1.11] [2.20]** [2.17]** [2.79]*** 
∆ROAt -0.1114 -0.5237 -0.2442 -0.2549 -0.2493 
 [0.34] [1.09] [6.60]*** [6.88]*** [5.98]*** 
∆ASSETt   0.2183 0.2120 0.2320 
   [10.49]*** [9.79]*** [10.26]*** 
∆LOSSt   0.0345 0.0323 0.0402 
   [3.78]*** [3.51]*** [3.97]*** 
∆EMPLt   0.0481 0.0507 0.0352 
   [1.66]* [1.64] [1.29] 
∆INVRECt   0.0659 0.1150 0.1213 
   [0.94] [1.59] [1.49] 
∆N_SEGt   0.0377 0.0358 0.0072 
   [1.57] [1.42] [0.28] 
∆FOROPSt   0.0140 0.0125 0.0170 
   [0.86] [0.76] [0.97] 
∆ADT_ALL   -0.1798 -0.2539 -0.0850 
   [11.27]*** [11.88]*** [4.54]*** 
∆RESTAT   -0.0329 -0.0340 -0.0353 
   [3.67]*** [3.77]*** [3.67]*** 
∆M&A   0.0284 0.0242 0.0250 
   [3.93]*** [3.31]*** [3.19]*** 
Intercept   0.0713 0.0615 0.0356 
   [2.08]** [1.78]* [0.91] 
Obs. 12,683 11,770 12,683 11,770 10,244 
Pseudo R2 0.1483 0.0609    
Adjusted R2   0.1502 0.1590 0.1721 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. To classify institutional ownership into short-term and long-term investment horizon, we follow 
the same procedures as employed in Bushee (1998). The BIG4 ONLY sample includes auditees of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. The Year and industry (2 digit SIC) dummy variables are included in all OLS regressions but not 
reported for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. The absolute value of the t-statistics is shown 
in brackets.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
34 
 
[Table 5] Auditor Changes – Intergroup and Within Changes 
VARIABLE AUDITOR CHANGE 
 TO BIG 4 TO NON-BIG4 WITHIN BIG4 WITHIN NON-B4 
∆INST_STt 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0035 
 [0.46] [0.22] [0.15] [0.79] 
∆INST_LTt -0.0018 -0.0057 -0.0010 -0.0071 
 [0.63] [2.83]*** [0.42] [1.58] 
∆SHORTt -0.0048 -0.1180 0.1355 -0.2573 
 [0.05] [1.43] [1.50] [1.83]* 
∆LONGt 0.1272 0.0693 -0.1847 -0.3652 
 [0.77] [0.37] [1.06] [1.39] 
∆SALESt 0.0533 -0.2920 0.0239 -0.0950 
 [0.69] [4.87]*** [0.31] [0.66] 
∆LNBMt 0.0104 -0.0618 -0.0033 0.0234 
 [0.29] [1.48] [0.07] [0.35] 
∆LEVt -0.2749 -0.5703 0.3478 0.0696 
 [0.87] [1.93]* [0.93] [0.14] 
∆LNLIQt -0.0598 -0.0917 0.1082 -0.0045 
 [0.67] [1.05] [1.13] [0.03] 
∆ISSUEt 0.1258 0.0901 -0.0991 -0.0120 
 [1.36] [1.35] [1.16] [0.12] 
∆ROAt 0.1781 0.2579 -0.0368 -0.3320 
 [1.00] [1.31] [0.18] [1.13] 
Intercept -2.0710 -2.2254 -6.4347 -6.8235 
 [6.26]*** [4.98]*** [12.66]*** [12.98]*** 
Obs. 12,120 11,966 9,295 1,894 
Pseudo R2 0.2626 0.0631 0.0282 0.0650 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. We follow the Year and industry (2 digit SIC) dummy variables are included in all probit 
regressions but not reported for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. The absolute value of 
the t-statistics is shown in brackets.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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[Table 6]  
Direction of Causality 
 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP CHANGE (∆INSTt+1 ) VARIABLE 
ALL NON-AA ALL NON-AA BIG4 ONLY 
∆AUDITORt -0.0017 0.5145    
 [0.00] [1.10]    
∆AFEEt   -0.0110 0.0007 -0.2137 
   [0.04] [0.00] [0.68] 
∆ASSETt 2.9331 3.2624 1.1890 1.6653 0.3189 
 [4.30]*** [4.64]*** [1.70]* [2.30]** [0.39] 
∆LNBMt 0.6387 0.5446 0.6562 0.4831 0.9571 
 [1.85]* [1.56] [1.84]* [1.36] [2.29]** 
∆LEVt -1.2695 -0.7300 1.1399 1.5684 4.9363 
 [0.76] [0.43] [0.65] [0.87] [2.47]** 
∆LNLIQt 2.0490 2.1040 1.2281 1.2464 1.2520 
 [4.71]*** [4.74]*** [2.87]*** [2.84]*** [2.52]** 
∆ISSUEt 0.3605 0.3446 -0.2857 -0.2115 -0.1363 
 [1.10] [1.02] [0.82] [0.59] [0.35] 
∆ROAt -5.1085 -5.1739 -3.9073 -3.9140 -3.1300 
 [5.34]*** [5.16]*** [4.02]*** [3.83]*** [2.59]*** 
∆MVt 6.8678 6.5266 7.4726 7.1424 7.8901 
 [15.77]*** [14.83]*** [16.62]*** [15.65]*** [15.00]*** 
∆RNDt -0.1209 -0.0762 -1.2298 -0.9553 -0.4497 
 [0.09] [0.05] [1.75]* [1.45] [0.56] 
∆DYDt -2.1441 -2.2886 -3.4974 -3.6762 -4.6834 
 [0.50] [0.53] [0.74] [0.78] [0.81] 
∆BETAt 0.5097 0.5932 -0.2421 -0.2476 -0.0517 
 [2.47]** [2.84]*** [1.16] [1.16] [0.21] 
∆MOM3t -1.9537 -1.8698 -1.7153 -1.6949 -1.5901 
 [8.44]*** [7.69]*** [7.14]*** [6.66]*** [5.92]*** 
∆MOM9t -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0027 
 [7.65]*** [7.82]*** [6.06]*** [6.39]*** [6.19]*** 
Intercept 0.7568 0.5285 2.1512 1.5360 1.4488 
 [0.55] [0.49] [0.92] [0.69] [0.59] 
Obs. 11,652 10,806 11,652 10,806 9,523 
Adjusted R2 0.1511 0.1466 0.1277 0.1233 0.1245 
  
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. We follow the Year and industry (2 digit SIC) dummy variables are included in all OLS regressions 
but not reported for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) covariance matrix. The absolute value of 
the t-statistics is shown in brackets.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
